Through the Eyes of a Twelve-Year-Old: The Cuban Education System

The following is an excerpt from my diary, written in Spanish when I was 12 years old in 2000. This is the year I started middle school at Simón Bolívar, a small school in one of the oldest municipalities of Havana: Diez de octubre. In Cuba, middle school comprises seventh, eighth, and ninth grades. Since it corresponds to the second level of teaching, it is officially termed “secundaria básica.”

For the purposes of this blog, I have chosen to rewrite the selected fragments in English and use past instead of present tense. I have also combined individual fragments into a coherent narrative. No modifications in content have been made.

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Classes began on September 4^th. My uniform consisted of a pleaded mustard-colored skirt and a white blouse with buttons. I was no longer wearing the “pañoleta,” or neckerchief, of elementary school. Instead, an insignia that read “Che” was sown on the only pocket of my blouse.

There were no classes on the first day of school. That day we studied the biography of Simón Bolívar and learned the “reglamento escolar,” or the rules of the school. On that first day a provisional “Jefe de destacamento,” or President of the classroom, was also selected for each of the 12 to 13 groups in each grade. The “guide” teacher assigned to each group would ask those students that had served as “Jefe de destacamento” in elementary school to volunteer to take the new post.

For seventh-graders, classes did not begin until late September, after the period of “aprestamiento” ended. While this introduction period lasted, students spent most of their time in school taking diagnostic tests in all the main subjects (Spanish Language, Mathematics, Ancient and Medieval History, Biology, Geography, Music and English). There were also diagnostic tests on the knowledge of “símbolos patrios,” on spelling, and on physical education. The Math Olympiad was also held during the first week. Three winners would be chosen from the school to compete at the “consejo popular” level, and later at municipal, provincial, national and even international levels.

When classes finally began, they met in the afternoon. In Biology, we were paying special attention to alcoholism and addictions in general, and in Mathematics, we studied Algebra as well as Geometry, especially the properties of angles. I received the most rigorous instruction in Mathematics at the review sessions organized by the municipal board of education for students who had qualified to attend the provincial Math Olympiad. These were intense three-hour drills that included taking exams from past Olympiads.

Aside from classes and Math review sessions, most days of the week I would be required to attend special morning sessions such as the viewing of a weekly audiovisual program about art, national symbols, sexuality in adolescence, and places of interest. Other special sessions were dedicated to the life of José Martí, to the cleaning of the school, or to those classes that did not meet daily such as Physical Education, Library Methodology, Values and Basic Drawing.

The morning was also the time to participate in extracurricular activities. Middle schools had chapters of national “círculos de interés” or pre-professional student organizations that ranged from gastronomy to scientific research to nursing. I was a member of the círculo de interés of pedagogy and in the mornings I would visit my old elementary school to help former teachers with grading. I was also in the school’s track team and during the first weeks of school, I was selected “Jefa de exploración y campismo” of my group. This position required me to prepare my group for participation in “acampadas,” or one-night trips to a nearby camping area where we learned different types of fires and knots and took tests on all skills learned. These tests were serious, as their results could affect our evaluation at the monthly “chequeos de emulación.” But acampadas were also an opportunity to stay up all night dancing and playing domino.

Throughout the year, the school also held numerous essay and drawing contests with topics such as “Aspiring to belong to the Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas (UJC)” or “Leer a Martí.” There was also a “batallón de ceremonias,” or marching guard, of which I was “Jefa de pelotón,” or Chief of squad in the frequent marching competitions.

Many activities took place outside of the school. On September 28^th, students participated in the annual “guardia pioneril” to commemorate the anniversary of the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR). Around eight PM, we would leave our houses wearing our uniforms and join the rest of the block in festivities celebrating the labor of vigilance of the CDR. We also participated in regular demonstrations at the anti-imperialist tribune built in front of the US Interests Section. Marches were organized in response to an event such as the death of two Cubans in the seas as they escaped to Miami, or as a form of national celebration on José Martí’s birthday. On the days these marches were scheduled, we would arrive in school around six AM, and leave in buses sometimes not until a few hours later. Schools of the same municipality would march together, though students usually left early to sit on the seawall of the nearby Malecón. Attendance to guardias pioneriles and demonstrations also counted toward our evaluation at the chequeos de emulación.

Elections for the “colectivo,” or student government, were a long process that began early in the year, with the selection of 13 pre-candidates. The school staff would eliminate five of these, and the autobiographies of the remaining eight would be posted on the school murals. All students were required to participate in the final voting process, and results were announced at the school party in celebration of the National Day of Culture. I was very surprised to be chosen President of Student Government in my first year of middle school. From then on, I had to preside over the daily “matutino,” a ceremony held as soon as students arrived in school. From a platform, I would formally initiate the matutino with the order “colectivo, firme,” followed by the order to raise the flag and sing the national anthem. During the ceremony, a student from a different group each day had to recite the “inmediatez de la noticia,” a brief news report prepared by the school board. Announcements on school activities would follow, before groups left to their respective classrooms in orderly lines.

My responsibilities as President included directing meetings with the rest of the colectivo and with jefes de destacamentos. I then would present the agreements drafted at these meetings to the school administration at the Consejos populares. One agreement, for example, was to have a policeman permanently outside of the school in order to keep the “elemento,” or delinquents, away. I would also receive special invitations to attend meetings with other Presidents of colectivos from other schools in the municipality, to Asambleas del poder popular and to the third national Congreso Pioneril. As President, I also had to supervise the collection of raw materials and of donations to the Milicias de Tropas Territoriales (MTT), and participate in special events like a reunion with the students from the International School of Sports, where I sat next to students from Haiti and Congo.

My responsibilities as President required that I miss class frequently. I could suddenly be called to an extraordinary Consejo de dirección, or a teacher would call me and ask for help with class discipline. In general, however, missing class was normal. Classes were stopped if fumigations were scheduled as part of the campaign to combat the outbreak of dengue fever. Students that participated in “brigadas de rescate” also frequently missed the first class of the day. These brigades were designed to counteract poor attendance and tardiness to school. After the matutino was over, the brigadas de rescate were sent around the neighborhood in search for students who had not been present for this ceremony, with the mission to bring them to school.

That year, for the first time in my life, I was not selected as “destacada,” or outstanding, in a chequeo de emulación. My guide teacher said I was not sufficiently integrated in the colectivo or in the school activities in general. I thought the chequeo had been unfair, and asked my mom to complain to the school. My father could not come, as he had left the country a few weeks before. In the end, the school administration agreed with my mom, and I was finally selected “destacada.” At that time, I decided to quit the presidency of the colectivo, but I was told I was not allowed to quit.

Comment to Valentin's post on Charisma, Fidel, and White Doves

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1) For Weber, Charisma is a type of legitimation of authority—i.e., how citizens or subjects justify their obedience to the ruler. The focus is on the motivations and feelings of the ruled, and not so much on objective features of the leaders (Gonzalez in the readings abuses a bit the Weberian concept, as his focus is on Fidel, not on the Cuban public).

The picture shows the other "barbudo:" less revolutionary, but probably crazier, and as brilliant.

2) For Weber, there are three polar types of legitimacy, which correspond to three different "subjective" motivations for obedience. One is fully rational, and obedience is to the rule of laws, not to persons. People obey because they think that rules (even bad ones!) provide stability to their lives and hence allow for rational calculations for individual plans of action. Modern constitutional governments of the North-Atlantic type (US, Western Europe post WWII), are the prime examples.

Another one is "traditional" legitimacy, which is semi-rational (people obey because they are used to obeying, and do not think too much about authority), and also impersonal (the focus of obedience is a tradition, not a person). Dynastic monarchies, in Medieval Europe, or African/Asian Ancient times, are the key political examples.

Charismatic authority, the third type, is both irrational (based on "love" to the ruler by the ruled, according to its Greek etymology), and personal: the target of the people's affection is a person, the leader, not rules or traditions. Examples? Ancient priests, druids, saints, military leaders, Jeanne d’Arc, Hitler, Ghandi … they were all the object of extraordinary amounts of admiration and love.

3) Is Castro a Charismatic leader? It is OK to say that in a dinner party in order to sound interesting. However, the real issue in Weber’s theory is that Charisma is not something inherent to Castro’s personality, responsibility, or body. Rather, the Cubans created a Charismatic authority by loving Castro ("Fidel, Fidel") and by attributing him supra-human, magical, attributes (pretty much like what progressive Americans did in relation to Obama only a year ago).

4) Does Castro WANT to be a Charismatic leader? Yes, of course. But the question is pertinent because Castro's speeches and policies are directed to a rational (not an irrational) audience: one that will appreciate the rational value of socialism, of a change in property rights, and the subsequent change in civic virtues and the enhancement of social cooperation. Only VERY rational citizens can get that message. Weber would have liked this: he thinks reality "mixes" theoretical ideal types in complicated, context-specific ways. Authority in Cuba is not only Charismatic. Were it so, it would have vanished long time ago.

5) An extension of (4). Castro exploits his Charisma (receives love) but the Revolution has been genuinely involved in creating a new, super-rational man (returns “consciencia”). Pretty unique authority process. The other few super-charismatic leaders, eg., Hitler, generally receive irrational support from their followers, and lead them to more irrationality.

Case Study in Charismatic Authority: Fidel and the Dove

The armed conflict between the 26th of July Movement and the Government of Cuba came to an end in the early morning hours of New Years' Day 1959. Facing limited prospects for success, then-president Fulgencio Batista fled Cuba for the Dominican Republic at 3 AM. The Commanders of the Revolution, as the leaders of the armed movement came to be known, quickly secured control over the provinces in the aftermath of Batista's departure. On January 8, 1959, Fidel Castro Ruz entered the city of Havana. On that very day, he delivered a lengthy victory speech in which he recounted the years that had preceded that occasion and outlined a course of action for the coming year.

At a pivotal moment in the speech, a dove landed on his shoulder and two others hovered around the stage. Over the past 50 years, this landing has been the subject of much speculation, controversy, and worship. Some have claimed that Luis Conte Agüero, at the time a Fidel ally and mentor, had spent the previous week training the dove for this performance. Others have suggested that lead pellets had been placed in the dove's beak prior to its release, weighing it down and forcing it to grasp for the first available... shoulder. Additional explanations have ranged from the random to the pheromonal.


Whatever the reasons for the dove landing, the dove landed. And hundreds of thousands of people watched as it landed on the shoulder of the man who would go on to become the longest serving head of state in the history of the Western Hemisphere. Millions more saw pictures of the seemingly unbelievable occurrence in the nation's newspapers and television channels.

As Fidel assured Cuban mothers that he "would do everything in his power to solve all of the nation's problems without a single drop of blood being shed," the dove (and the community of doves that stood beside it) entrusted the 32-year-old revolutionary with the power to lead them into a differentiated state of affairs. In one totalizing moment, the natural seemed to yield to the discursive, the impossible seemed possible, and the mythic peacefully gave credence to the political. It is this last point, whereby new power structures arose from what, at first glance, may have looked like thin air, that holds particular salience for the course.

How did Castro parlay his victory (or Batista's defeat) into authority with a monopoly on violence? In other words, how did Castro's authority achieve legitimacy? One possible explanation for this process of legitimation rests on the notion of charismatic authority, one of three ideal types (Idealtyp) that German sociologist Max Weber used to classify forms of political domination, best explained in his aptly-titled book, The Three Types of Legitimate Rule.

Richard R. Fagen notes that Weber defines charisma as "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with superhuman, supernatural, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities." Some who witnessed the dove-on-the-shoulder moment perceived it as nothing short of a miracle, an anointment from the heavens, a moment of spiritual transcendence. This moment, then, corresponds directly with the formation (or at least, the concretization) of Fidel's authority-cum-charisma. Whether a symbol of divine kingmaking or a happenstance call to peace, the dove created (or contributed to) a visual narrative of Fidel's legitimacy. Please refer to Fagen's article, "Charismatic Authority and the Leadership of Fidel Castro," originally published in the June 1965 Western Political Quarterly, for an overview of the relationship between charisma and authority vis-à-vis 1959-1965 Fidel Castro. (The article is one of the readings for Week 8.) Alternatively, turn to Alejo Carpentier's El Reino de Este Mundo for a literary take on charismatic authority in the context of the Haitian Revolution.



An editorial on the front page of the January 9, 1959 edition of Diario de la Marina, one of Cuba's leading center-right newspapers at the time, declared:

Cuando todo el pueblo de Cuba escuchaba ayer las palabras del supremo adalid del movimiento revolucionario, comandante doctor Fidel Castro, pronunciadas desde el polígono de la Ciudad Militar de Columbia, una paloma blanca, una de las muchas que soltó al vuelo la mano limpia de nuestro pueblo, vino a posarse sobre el hombro del Comandante en Jefe del Ejército Rebelde. Nosotros, junto a la mayoría abrumadora de todos los cubanos, no podemos creer que tal suceso haya sido una simple incidencia, una anécdota sin importancia.

No; en la paloma blanca sobre la mano diestra de Fidel Castro vimos un claro signo del Altísimo, porque ese signo universal de la paz traduce e interpreta cabalmente el gran deseo, la voluntad entera, de todo el pueblo cubano.

The editorial affirms that it saw "a clear sign of Providence" in the white dove, "the universal sign of peace that fully translates and interprets the grand wish, the entire will, of the Cuban people." (The newspaper would go on to cease publication in May 1960 in response to government pressure and organized acts of violence and vandalism.)

The first minute of the following clip from Estela Bravo's 2001 documentary, Fidel: The Untold Story, shows video evidence of the landing and delves into its perceived religious significance:



The dove landing continues to hold currency in Cuban politics. A January 2008 Reuters article, in which a Cuban babalao (high priest in the Santería religion) asserts that Fidel is "untouchable," includes the following:

Santería followers have believed their gods were on Fidel Castro's side ever since a white dove landed on his shoulder during a victory speech in Havana after his 1959 revolution.

The following video shows a March 2009 performance-art piece assembled by Cuban artist Tania Bruguera, in which members of the audience were given the opportunity to speak for one minute in front of a microphone as two actors placed a dove atop their shoulder, evoking (arguably, parodying and subverting) Fidel's 1959 speech:



The story of Fidel's dove and its many photographic iterations serve as a reminder of the continued interplay between charisma and the reified power relations of the Cuban Revolution.

Voluntary Work -- The Official Story

Contemporary narrative of Moral Incentives: Bohemia 2009

Key Points on the Literacy Campaign

Key Events of the Literacy Campaign:

• Summer 1957: Sierra Manifesto decreed that upon victory there would be an “immediate start of an intensive campaign against illiteracy”
• April 1959: Literacy Commission established to lay the groundwork for an eventual campaign
• September 26, 1960: Fidel Castro announces Literacy Initiative at the General Assembly of the United Nations
• October 1960: Literacy Commission replaced by National Literacy Commission to prepare for the broad effort in 1961
• Late 1960: National Literacy Commission produces major teaching materials (Alfabeticemos, Let’s Alphabetize, and Venceremos, We Shall Triumph). Both had significant political content
• November 1960-August 1961: Census to locate illiterates was conducted on an ongoing basis. 985,000 were located by August ‘61
• January 23, 1961: Castro announces that Conrado Benitez was assassinated by counterrevolutionaries while teaching in Las Villas
• January 28, 1961: Castro announces that all secondary and pre-university schools would close on April 15. This freed 100,000 literacy workers from the ranks of students older than 13 years. // Same time that “Conrado Benitez Brigades” were formed
• April 1961: Bay of Pigs invasion. Distracted Fidel for a few days, but gave more impetus to the literacy campaign as a tool to combat hostility from outside by strengthening the Revolution
• May 1961-August 1961: Members of Conrado Benitez Brigades are trained at Varadero beach.
• August 1961: Fidel Castro calls up 30,000 brigadistas obreros from the Confederation of Cuban Workers
• September 1961: National Literacy Congress convened to celebrate, criticize, and plan improvemenets in the literacy campaign
• September 18, 1961: Fidel Castro says that teachers would be required to work on the literacy campaign for the last three months of the year (no longer a voluntary program)
• Late November, 1961: Manuel Asunce (literacy worker) killed by counterrevolutionaries. Gives impetus to the final few weeks of the campaign much like the Conrado Benitez’s murder gave impetus to the start of the movement.
• December 15, 1961: Trains with literacy workers pour into Havana celebrating success (similar to entrance of victorious guerillas in 1959- Fagan, 53)
• December 22, 1961: Grand finale of the illiteracy campaign // In his speech Castro emphasized the theme that “while the mercenary [US-backed] army had been drawing up battle plans to attack Cuba, the Cubans had been drawing up battle plans to eradicate illiteracy” (Fagan 54) // At the end, one out of four eligible Cubans had participated as volunteers in the literacy campaign

Analysis:

One of the literacy campaign’s successes was the mobilization of both the literacy workers and the illiterate towards political ends. Parts of this analysis stems from Fagan and part stems from course lectures.

Facing the end of guerilla warfare, which had defined the very existence of the revolutionaries, there needed to be some cause, some mechanism to make revolutionaries out of young people who had not had a chance to fight in the Sierra Maestra. To crystallize commitment to the revolution, according to Castro, young people and teachers had to go out and spread its work to the masses. The youth involved in the literacy campaign were agents of social change, but, perhaps more importantly, their political fervor was galvanized by the transformative experience of bringing the Revolution to the masses.

The goal of teaching those who were illiterate to read was a noble one; however, literacy can also be seen as a proxy to political participation and support of the Castro regime. As Professor Dominguez said in one of the Q&A sessions, many were taught that “F is for Fidel” and “I is for Imperialism.” Those who were taught to read had their eyes opened to the written word at a time when only government-run newspapers or approved books were legally available. Was the goal of the Castro regime social justice or political consolidation and loyalty? It is difficult to tell for sure, but the answer is probably a combination of both. They were creating a revolution in the name of improving the situation of the lowest classes, but they also had to ensure that they maintained the support of the lower classes through political mobilization.

Literacy Campaign Timeline

September 26, 1960: Speech to the United Nations General Assembly
Castro declares that “next year our people propose to launch an all-out offensive against illiteracy… Cuba will be the first country in America to be able to claim that it has not a single illiterate inhabitant.”

Early October 1960: First Congress of the Municipal Councils of Education
Local level and Ministry of Education officials convene and start to strategize. This first conference shows that Castro did arrange for some planning in the campaign.

Late October 1960: Creation of Comision Nacional de Alfabetizacion
The Comision Alfabetizacion (Literacy Commission), which was created after the rebels came to power, was replaced by new Comision Nacional de Alfabetizacion (National Commission), which was structurally different. It tied the local councils of education to national key members of government. It became vast machine for financial, propaganda and mobilization means.

November 1960: Special Census to Locate Illiterates Begins
The government sends out students, teachers, and voluntary census takers to the country side with a single page questionnaire to comb the villages for illiterates. It ended in August 1961, having found that roughly 1 million people in Cuba cannot read.

December 1960 – January 1961: Recruitment Efforts Start Full Force
Before this point, there were students and teachers in training, in the mountains. Parts of Red Army and IRNA and people in the cities became volunteer teachers for the Ministry of Education. Castro starts making more speeches, getting the word out (New Years Eve speech, etc.). There was no formal plan yet, but the propaganda machine was in place.

January 23, 1961: Death of Conrado Benitez Announced
Benitez was a young volunteer in Las Villas. “He was poor, he was a Negro, and he was a teacher,” and according to Castro, he was assassinated by counterrevolutionaries. Castro used the opportunity to further advertise the campaign. He turned the literacy project into issue of great national importance, and the young man into a Saint of the revolution.

January 28, 1961: Early Closing of Schools and Formation of “Conrado Benitez Brigadistas”
Castro announced that all secondary and pre-university schools will close on April 15, so that an army of literacy workers can be created. All children over the age of thirteen, will be given the “honor and privilege” of serving. Castro named the forces of students and young people “Benitez Brigadistas.”

Mid March 1961: Castro Takes Over Ministry of Education
The Minister of Education, Armando Hart, left for a tour of Eastern Europe. Castro considered this project so important, that he personally stepped in.

May 1, 1961: Post Bay of Pigs Speech—Castro Announces Nationalization of All Schools
Castro reaffirmed the socialist, radical, nature of the revolution, and gloated in the victory against the Yankees at the Bay of Pigs. He announces an end to the pre-revolutionary system of education.

Late May 1961: Varedero Beach Resort Training Center Expanded
Students and youth lived in hotels, clubs, former luxury resorts, taking special classes on revolutionary politics and rural life, participating in various recreational activities. By the end of August 1961, 105,700 students had been through the facilities. It is not the physical location or the programming that made the experience; it was the spirit, the fulfillment of revolutionary obligations, in the air.

May-June 1961: Teachers Join Campaign as Alfabetizadores Populares
After primary schools closed for the year, teachers joined, mostly as overseers on municipal levels, supervising students. They received a salary for this work.

Early August 1961: Confederation of Cuban Workers mobilizes 30,000 Brigadistas Obreros
Workers were called away from factories and shops to go teach. They received stipends and a salary while they traveled. The workers remaining in factories had to make up the work through over time and voluntary work. Teachers and workers served mostly as a back-up force to the Benitez brigades.

Early September 1961: National Literacy Congress
A Convention takes place at the ex-Havana Hilton Hotel, now called Havana Libre, for 4 days with 800 members, of national, provincial, municipal council, present. They came together to celebrate, to criticize and to improve the campaign. They stressed that there were only three months left to carry out the plan. They had the man power and apparatus in place—now the teaching had to start.

Mid September 1961: Beginning of School Year Delayed from September to January 1962
Most of the Ministry of Education personnel were working on the campaign, teachers were still in the field, and thus school could not start. This means students in Cuba were out of schools for eight months in 1961. At the same time, a “Plan of attendance” was established. Volunteers and parents set up alternative activities for children.

November 1961: Mass Celebrations and Final Push Start
Communities wrapped up their literacy programs and celebrated their achievements. Mass “graduation” ceremonies were arranged, awards, certificates, flags were handed out, and whole areas were declared free of illiteracy. “Acceleration camps” were set up to help those who had fallen behind and scholarships were promised to brigadistas who completed the program successfully.

Late November 1961: Death of Brigadista Manuel Ascunce Announced
A Brigadista and the father of the family with which the student was living, were hanged outside of the family home. Castro claimed it was done by counterrevolutionaries. This event gave the final weeks an incredible sense of urgency.

December 15, 1961: The Brigadistas Return Home
Trains from the provinces carried brigadistas home to Havana. A whole army of youth gathered to share their experiences. They were still wearing their uniforms and peasant’s hats upon arrival.

December 22, 1961: The Grand Finale
Hundreds of thousands met at Plaza to celebrate the campaign’s victory. “First came a gigantic Cuban flag, escorted by motorcycle police, then the flags of Socialist and Latin American countries….dignitaries and officials of the camping came next, then five hundred literacy workers with lanterns …five thousand soldiers of the literacy campaign bearing giant pencils…then came the brigadistas” (Fagan 53).


Pre Literacy Campaign: Purposes
Already in 1953, during his trial for the attack on the Moncada Army barrack, Castro proclaimed that it is unacceptable that 99% of peasants cannot spell their name and know nothing of history. By 1957, he included his passion for education in the Manifesto of Sierra Maestra. The campaign against illiteracy became part of ten point revolutionary program. Data from the 1950’s confirms that the Cuban education system greatly disadvantaged the lower classes, and that there was a decline in literacy. This partially explains the broad support the campaign received.

Post Literacy Campaign: Results
Critics point to the fact that only a first grade level of reading skills was achieved during the campaign, much too low to have real and immediate effects. The knowledge that had been gained would quickly slip away. Most importantly, 28% of those illiterates located in the census, would not or could not be taught. According to this evaluation, the campaign was a definite failure. Supporters point to the amazing scope and reach of the effort. Over one sixth of the country was mobilized. The everyday life of most Cubans was directly touched and affected by the campaign. Being able to finally spell their names, meant very much to the illiterates helped by the project. Reviews are mixed at best.

Comment:

The Cuban Literacy Campaign of 1961 was one of the most fantastic and dreamlike, almost whimsical, events of the early revolutionary period. A whole country was mobilized within months—children, teenagers, were driven into the countryside and mountains—peasants opened their homes to those children and for the most part, willingly received their instruction—teachers, government officials, and Fidel Castro himself, dropped what they were working on to momentarily dedicate themselves to the cause. An immense effort was poured into training teachers, printing materials, keeping labor running and younger children occupied, while the rest of the country had to function as well. The Cuban people threw themselves into a challenge which “was large enough to appear heroic without at the same time appearing absolutely impossible” (Fagan 36).

The project was turned over to the people in true revolutionary style. “The planning and organizational work would come after, not before this commitment” (Fagan 65). Fidel and Cuba committed to the campaign before any strategy was developed. Chaos was the plan, especially during the last couple of months, which is all the brigadistas had left to actually teach the people. At various random moments of the campaign, Castro haphazardly called on this organization, and that organization, to provide this many thousands of teachers. Castro’s whim was the plan, especially during the months when he ran the Ministry of Education. But the hectic and haphazard pace is exactly what the revolutionary government wanted—this was after all a revolutionary campaign. Castor firmly believed that “the act of trying, the struggle itself, opens up possibilities that could not have been imagined before the battle” (Fagan 65). The literacy campaign was as astonishing, albeit imperfect, a feat, as the effort of a dozen men in the Sierra Mountains.

Voice of the Cuban Revolution: Carlos Franqui

In 2007, the Cuban-American Undergraduate Student Association (CAUSA...www.harvardcausa.org) was able to bring Carlos Franqui to campus to have a discussion on the Cuban Revolution with one of the few outside of Cuba who actually lived it and fought alongside Fidel Castro. We have read parts of the Diary of the Cuban Revolution in the course. He spoke to about 80 undergraduates and members of the community in the CGIS Belfer Case Study Room.

(Franqui pictured in CGIS, with former HS B-64 TF Alfie Ulloa)

This was the blurb that introduced him:

“Born on a sugar cane plantation, Carlos Franqui rose through the ranks of the Communist Party in the years before the Cuban Revolution. He fought alongside Fidel Castro in the Sierra Maestra as his chief journalist, writing for the newspaper Revolución and organizing Radio Rebelde. In 1968, disillusioned with Castro's regime, he defected to Italy. A prolific writer and advocate of free expression, he has published numerous books, including Diary of the Cuban Revolution, one of the most authoritative collections of documents from the Revolution. He currently lives in Puerto Rico where he founded Carta de Cuba which features works by independent journalists on the island. “

Franqui is now in his late 80’s, and he resides with his wife and children in Puerto Rico. His background as an active participant in the Revolution has meant that Miami’s exiles have never fully embraced him. However, his intellectual openness and demands for civil liberties made him fall out of favor with the Castro regime.

After he left Cuba, he was actually erased from many records of the revolution, most notably, from this picture where he appeared with Fidel. (click image to see the picture with Franqui in it)

In response to this editing, Franqui wrote a poem:

“Descubro mi muerte fotográfica.

Qué existo?

Estoy un poco de negro,

Estoy un poco de blanco,

Yo soy un poco de mierda,

El chaleco de Fidel.”

I discover my photographic death.

Do I exist?


I am a little black,


I am a little white,


I am a little shit,


On Fidel's vest.

He recently wrote an interesting book entitled “Cuba, la revolucion, mito o realidad? Memorias de un fantasma socialista” (Cuba, the Revolution, Myth or Reality? Memories of a Socialist Ghost), which talks about some of the failed promises of the regime and prospects for improvment. He also founded Carta de Cuba (www.cartadecuba.org), a newsletter that publishes the writings of independent journalists and dissidents on the island.

Moral Incentives Polish Style

In the "Man of Marble," the best movie I've seen on Eastern European Communism, it's all about emulation.

This segment has the key three components: 1) incentivized by emulation and the logic of "voluntary" work, 2) a hard working young revolutionary, Mateusz Birkut, sets a productivity record, which in turn earns him 3) the full range of moral individual rewards: medal, flowers, handshakes with political authorities, invitation to festivities, admiration by women, emulation by (male) fellow workers, the marble statue (which gives the name to the movie, The Man of Marble) ... and a documentary about his life!



You can watch the rest (about 120 minutes) in YouTube. The above segment was part 3 of 17.

Exports and Prices of Cuban Sugar

Click to enlarge

Cats and dogs and Cubans

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US Pushed: stupid decisions that fueled the hate.

Quotes from the November 58 issue of Life Magazine:

"The liveliest charity ball of the New York season" was dedicated to the "Cuban Cause."

What is the "Cuban Cause"? To "send deserving young Cubans to design school."

"Waldorf Astoria decorated with Palm Trees"

"Jackie wore Givenchy."

Climax, from a guest: "Cats and dogs and Cubans are my charities this year."


Click on image to enlarge

1959-61: Revolutionary take-off

1) Any chronology of the first three years of the Cuban revolution shows one clear overarching trend: RADICALIZATION.

• International relations: gradual but rapid adoption of a starkly adversarial stand against the US; Sovietization in particular. From timid "Andreev opening" in Oct 1959 to full blown geopolitical, commercial, and political alliance with the Kremlin by late 1961. For the US, from the cold but still non adversarial visit by Fidel to the East Coast to Bay of Bigs and Missile Crisis.
• Economic policy: increasing state control and socialization, from rent controls in April 1959 to massive expropriation of assets, rural or industrial, foreign or national.
• Politics: embrace of Communism. From Urrutia's government (first months of 1959) to the ORI, via alliance with, and subsequent control of, Communist Party.

Hence, big picture is massive radicalization in all political and social orders.

2) What are the causes of radicalization?

In adversarial/complementary pairs, explanations are:

• Ideological. Castro's ideology: ultra radical from the start (Lecture 08, Suchlicki) or increasingly radical over time.
• Pragmatic, non-ideological (my favorite). Initial measures hurt some allies (the moderates, the US), which require substitution (PSP, USSR); new allies demand more radical measures, which in turn fuels the selecion process in favor of increasingly radical allies (Welch). Protection of revolution = radicalization of revolution (why I like it? Because it is eminently political, and is a very general mechanism, from French Revolution to Independence Wars in Latin America in the early 19th century. The Cuban novelty is the absence of a Termidor).

• Learning (Dominguez, Perez, Castro himself, all with very different flavors): rebel leaders realize that moderation or gradual reform is not a feasible option. Any change = radical change. Underlying economic, structural conditions shape stark options: radical change or staus quo (O'Connor, Perez).
• Positive feedback loop between Castro and followers (Perez): Castro proposes a radical measure, followers increase their expectations for change, Castro proposes a more radical measure, which in turn raises again public expectations for change.

• US errors and incompetent policies: stupidity and carelessness push Castro and Cuba into Communism and USSR's hands (Lecture 11).
• International political structures: geopolitical competition between US and USSR dragged Cuba into a much larger world game (reinterpretation of Lecture 11 using Waltz's neo-realism in IR).

3) Note: question of radicalization of revolution is obviously different from question of why rebels triumphed or why Batista fell. However, some causes of radicalization post January 1959 (economic structure a la O'Connor, or Ideology, or US diplomatic and IR errors) can also explain the events leading to the December 1958 revolutionary juncture.

Public Letter of Cuban Bishops to Castro

Carta abierta de los Obispos al Primer Ministro Dr. Fidel Castro

La Habana, 4 de Diciembre de 1960

Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz

Primer Ministro de la República

Habana, Cuba.

Señor:

Graves sucesos ocurridos en los últimos tiempos nos han decido dirigimos colectivamente a Ud. para tratarle acerca de la situación de la Iglesia en nuestro país

No habíamos querido escribirle antes oficialmente sobre estos temas, porque la Iglesia, que es y se siente madre de todos los cubanos sea cual fuere su filiación política, no deseaba que ningún documento suyo pudiese ser interpretado como expresión de una actitud partidaria, que no cuadraría bien con su misión, esencialmente religiosa y sobrenatural; pero, dado el giro que van tomando las cosas en Cuba en relación con la Iglesia, nuestro deber de pastores nos obliga a exponer públicamente una serie de hechos que nos han producido un profundo pesar

Ya en el pasado año tuvo la Iglesia, en distintos momentos, ser motivos de preocupación, como cuando, a pesar de las reiteradas declaraciones de Ud. en que se sostenía el carácter no comunista del Gobierno, supimos que en los textos de adoctrinamiento revolucionario se enfocaban diversos problemas históricos y filosóficos con un criterio netamente marxista, y que numerosos profesores encargados de dicho adoctrinamiento aprovechaban sus conferencias para defender abierta las ideas comunistas y para denigrar las doctrinas y la obra de la Iglesia.

Estas preocupaciones vinieron a agravarse cuando publicamos el pasado mes de agosto una Circular Colectiva, en que se alababan medidas tomadas por el Gobierno Revolucionario en beneficio de humildes, pero se señalaba el peligro que representaba para nuestra patria el auge de la ideología comunista.

El mismo día que fue publicada, se detuvo a varios sacerdote por el delito de haberle dado lectura en las Iglesias, y se amenazó a otros con represalias populares si se atrevían a leerlas.

Si antes había habido más bien ataques aislados a los Obispos sacerdotes y organizaciones católicas, a partir de este momento puede decirse que comenzó una campaña anti religiosa de dimensiones nacionales que cada día se ha ido haciendo más virulenta.

Se han organizado mítines en muchos pueblos en que se ha insultado y vejado a los sacerdotes, a ciencia y paciencia de las autoridades locales.

Han sido clausuradas casi todas las horas católicas de radio y televisión.

Se ha injuriado y calumniado a los Obispos y a prestigiosas instituciones católicas por medio de los periódicos y las estaciones de radio hoy casi totalmente bajo el control del gobierno, y al mismo tiempo ha impedido la publicación o difusión de los documentos que en defensa de la Iglesia han suscrito las organizaciones seglares católicas, así como de las últimas pastorales del Sr. Arzobispo de Santiago de Cuba.

Se han formado, con la simpatía y el calor de las autoridades, asociaciones llamadas católicas, que parece que tienen como fin, no el propagar la doctrina de la Iglesia, sino el combatir a la Jerarquía.

Agentes provocadores han interrumpido en muchas ocasiones los actos religiosos en nuestros templos, sin que haya caído ninguna sanción sobre ellos.

Destacados voceros del Gobierno han declarado públicamente, distintos momentos, que ser contrario al comunismo equivale a ser contra revolucionario y no ha habido jamás una refutación oficial de esta tesis.

Todos estos hechos, y otros más que no enumeramos por no hacer demasiado largo este documento, podían acaso ser atribuidos, tratando de echar las cosas a buena parte, a criterios personales de ciertos funcionarios, o a consignas de ciertos grupos políticos, y no al gobierno mismo.

En días pasados fuimos dolorosamente sorprendidos por las palabras pronunciadas por Ud., en su condición de jefe de gobierno, desde la escalinata de la Universidad de la Habana.

Podemos, desde luego, suponer que las críticas que allí se hicieron contra los "colegios de los privilegiados", no se dirigían a las escuela católicas, ya que en ellas reciben educación y enseñanza miles y miles de niños y jóvenes de familias modestísimas, como lo prueba el hecho de ser muchas de ellas gratuitas o semigratuitas, y de existir e todas las demás un elevadísimo porcentaje de alumnos que disfrutan de becas totales o parciales, con más razón todavía tenemos que pensar que tampoco se atacó a nuestros colegios cuando se habló de "esos centros' en que se predica el odio contra la Patria y el odio contra el obrero y el campesino, porque nos costaría mucho trabajo creer, que ningún miembro de Gobierno sea capaz de lanzar gratuitamente una calumnia burda.

Pero no podemos pasar por alto las críticas que allí se dirigieron a nuestros heroicos curas de campo y a la Universidad de Villanueva..

Villanueva no es, como se ha afirmado el otro día, "una Universidad de Yanquilandia" sino una Universidad católica y cubana, una de la Iglesia cuyo profesorado está formado casi íntegramente por cubanos, y en que el aporte extranjero se halla representado por un grupo reducidísimo de padres agustinos, que no vinieron a este país para lucrar con su trabajo, sino servir a Cuba y a invertir en ella el dinero que les habían donado en otros países,

Más grave todavía para el prestigio de la Iglesia es que, con injustamente hiriente, se llame "botelleros" a abnegados sacerdotes que desempeñan una ejemplar labor espiritual y social en los ingenios, causa de las retribuciones que recibían de ciertas empresas, para su propio sostenimiento, para sus trabajos de apostolado y para sus obra de caridad, porque quien esto afirme está sosteniendo públicamente la inutilidad de la religión, al considerar las actividad de los sacerdotes equivalente a la de quienes inmoralmente recibían dinero sin trabajar. No conocemos, por otra parte, un solo caso de un capellán de un central que hubiera actuado como instrumento de explotación de los obreros, y sí de muchos casos en que los capellanes defendieron los derechos de los trabajadores, poniéndose inclusive al frente de ellos en momentos de huelga.

Cuando se nos atacó personalmente a nosotros pudimos callar porque, si como hombres teníamos el derecho a exigir una reparación, como obispos teníamos el deber de perdonar. Pero cuando se lastima e hiere a nuestros hijos espirituales, no actuaríamos como legítimos pastores de la grey que nos ha sido confiada, si no saliéramos en defensa de sus derechos y de su honra.

Queremos también insistir aquí en la grave injusticia con que, en varios momentos, se nos ha acusado públicamente de estar a la órdenes de fuerzas internacionales o potencias extranjeras, cuando es, por el contrario, bien sabido de todos que la Iglesia ha defendido siempre sin vacilaciones, en público y en privado, el derecho del pueblo de Cuba a su soberanía política y al pleno desenvolvimiento de sus capacidades económicas, y que el Episcopado no ha tenido jamás otra meta en sus actuaciones que al servicio de la Iglesia y de Cuba. Es innecesario recordarle, Sr. Primer Ministro, que la Iglesia ha enseñado siempre como norma fundamental de la conducta humana, la primacía de los valores del espíritu sobre todos los intereses de orden material, y por ello la Jerarquía Eclesiástica Cubana, siguiendo el ejemplo de los cristianos de todos los tiempos, está dispuesta a sacrificarse sin temor alguno y a perderlo todo antes que claudicar en sus principios.

Por lo demás, los Obispos de la Iglesia Católica tenemos por norma inquebrantable tratar siempre con el máximo respeto, y con cristiana caridad a todos, amigos o adversarios, y aun a nuestros gratuitos detractores, y cuando defendemos, aunque sea con la mayor energía nuestros principios, sabemos guardar la debida consideración a las personas que no piensen como nosotros.

Esperando, pues, que por parte del gobierno se tomen las medidas necesarias a fin de que cesen los repetidos ataques de que se está haciendo objeto a los católicos, queremos reiterarle, Sr. Primer Ministro, la seguridad de nuestras continuas oraciones para que el Señor le ilumine de modo que los pasos que dé el Gobierno que Ud. preside, vayan encaminados al bien de esta Patria cubana, a cuyo pleno engrandecimiento hemos consagrado todos nuestros esfuerzos, sacrificios, y desvelos.

Atentamente,

Manuel, Cardenal Arteaga, Arzobispo de la Habana

Enrique, Arzobispo de Santiago de Cuba

Evelio, Arzobispo Coadjutor y Admor. Apostólico de la Habana

Carlos, Obispo de Camagüey

Manuel, Obispo de Pinar del Río

Alfredo, Administrador apostólico de Cienfuegos

José, Obispo Auxiliar de la Habana

Eduardo, Obispo Auxiliar de la Habana

Manuel, Vicario Capitular de la Diócesis de Matanzas

OAS expels Cuba

El 31 de enero de 1962, en la Octava Reunión de Consulta de Ministros de Relaciones Exteriores de la OEA, celebrada en Punta del Este, Uruguay, se aprobó las siguientes resoluciones relacionadas a Cuba:

1. Que la adhesión de cualquier miembro de la Organización de los Estados Americanos al marxismo-leninismo es incompatible con el Sistema Interamericano y el alineamiento de tal Gobierno con el bloque comunista quebranta la unidad y solidaridad del hemisferio.

2. Que el actual Gobierno de Cuba, que oficialmente se ha identificado como un Gobierno marxista-leninista es incompatible con los principios y propósitos del Sistema Interamericano.

3. Que esta incompatibilidad excluye al actual Gobierno de Cuba de su participación en el Sistema Interamericano.

4. Que el Consejo de la Organización de los Estados Americanos y los otros órganos y organismos del Sistema Interamericano adopten sin demora las providencias necesarias para cumplir esta Resolución.

Estas resoluciones fueron adoptada por el voto de catorce países a favor, uno en contra (Cuba) y seis abstenciones (Argentina, Bolivia, Brasil, Chile, Ecuador y México), y por la cual se excluyó al actual Gobierno de Cuba de participar en el Sistema Interamericano.

Student Help: the "Pacts"

1957. July 12: Sierra Maestra Manifesto
November: Miami Pact
December: Castro denounces Miami Pact

1958. July 20: Pacto de Caracas


Central element for political analysis:

• Trade-off b/w goal of coalition building and goal of coalition control.

Then, two key questions:

1. Who is included as ally, who is excluded, and who gains control in each step?
2. What is more at stake: ideology or control? (Hint: compare Castro's argument against Miami Pact and his position in Caracas Pact, especially regarding military intervention).
   

Pacts are the visible results in the constant search for allies. Castro's condemnation of Miami pact (which excluded him) is part and parcel of his systematic efforts at keeping control over a movement that depends on coalition mobilization and expansion.

Pacts and counter-pacts are motivated both by the search of allies and the goal of control.

Student Help: FRUS

Framework for analysis

Dimension + examples in the late 1957 documents

1. Actors involved: State Department, US Embassy in Cuba, Pentagon, CIA, Attorney General (some proper names: Rubottom, Smith)
2. Actors mentioned: GOC (Batista), Cienfuegos mutineers, Miami Diaspora (Prio), Rebels (Fidel), US Congress, Public Opinion, International Communism.
3. Goals of actors involved: a) maximization of US international security and hemispheric defense (Pentagon); b) preservation of alliance with Cuban conservative elements (US Embassy in Cuba); c) Protection of capitalism/US property in Cuba ("Morley's goal," more imagined than real, but has some archival evidence); d) protection of international reputation (State Department); e) appeasement of US public opinion (politically/electorally minded types in State Department, Attorney). TWO CRUCIAL ISSUES: trade-offs b/w goals; negotiations between actors with different goals.
4. Concrete issues discussed: a) Prio problem (application of neutrality laws against exiles conspiring against Batista and supplying rebels), b) violation of MAP problem, c) radicalization of rebellion, d) Batista's dictatorial measures.
5. Policies suggested (means to achieve goals in 3). Big picture: "moderation" of political process. Problem: rebels and dictator do not trust each other, so prisoner's dilemma. US places incentives for moderation on both sides. For Batista, combination of sticks (suspension of arms sales, public condemnation) and carrots (control of Prio, public support). To break the vicious circle of distrust, US volunteers as a credible enforcer of moderation. Suspend arms if Batista does not de-escalate. Reinforce Batista is rebels do not de-escalate. Did not foresee the event that neither would de-escalate!
   

13 March 1958: Palace Attacked, Echeverria Killed

Praetorian Students, American Tanks

1933: Armed Students (and the books?). Key actors in the overthrow of Machado's government. Not just "social" mobilization: military mobilization as well! Samuel Huntington, following pioneering ideas of Sociologist Gino Germani, was the first to link modernization and praetorianism. Yet he dismissed students as a powerful agent of political change. The population of Universidad de la Habana may disagree.


1950s: where do these tanks come from? MAP? If used for internal repression (what else in Cuba?), public opinion in US may get nervous and constraint what decision-makers can do to help Batista rebuild political order.

Too big a university for too small an Island?
Aerial view of the Universidad de la Habana in the 1940s

Revolution Betrayed

USA conspires against Fidel

Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960, Volume VI, Cuba.

481. Paper Prepared by the 5412 Committee

Washington, March 16, 1960.

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention. Essentially the method of accomplishing this end will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U.S. before the covert action program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressively to improve the capability of the U.S. to act in a crisis.

2. Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of action:

a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba. [3 sentences (10 lines) not declassified] (Tab A)

b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means for mass communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition. The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island. [2 sentences (4 lines) not declassified] (Tab B)

c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be responsive to the orders and direction of the "exile" opposition. [3 sentences (7 lines) not declassified]

d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the necessary logistic support of covert military operations on the Island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U.S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably closer to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires. Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country.

[Numbered paragraphs 3-5 (29 lines) not declassified] (Tab C)

6. Recommendations: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized to undertake the above outlined program [2 lines not declassified].

Tab B

PROPAGANDA

1. [paragraph (8 lines) not declassified]

2. As the major voice of the opposition, it is proposed to establish at least one "gray" U.S.-controlled station. This will probably by on Swan Island and will employ both high frequency and broadcast band equipment of substantial power. The preparation of scripts will be done in the U.S. and these will be transmitted electronically to the site for broadcasting. After some experience and as the operation progresses, it may be desirable to supplement the Swan Island station with at least one other to ensure fully adequate coverage of all parts of Cuba, most especially the Havana region. [3 paragraphs (19 lines) not declassified]

Accidental Revolution

What if the Congress of Latin American Students had been organized in a different city or a different date? What if Gaitan's assassin had failed?



Student Fidel, in a business/tourism trip to Bogota, the exact same week of Gaitan's assassination and the ensuing urban upheaval. He looks happier than a child with a new toy (o perro con dos colas).