Comment to Valentin's post on Charisma, Fidel, and White Doves

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1) For Weber, Charisma is a type of legitimation of authority—i.e., how citizens or subjects justify their obedience to the ruler. The focus is on the motivations and feelings of the ruled, and not so much on objective features of the leaders (Gonzalez in the readings abuses a bit the Weberian concept, as his focus is on Fidel, not on the Cuban public).

The picture shows the other "barbudo:" less revolutionary, but probably crazier, and as brilliant.

2) For Weber, there are three polar types of legitimacy, which correspond to three different "subjective" motivations for obedience. One is fully rational, and obedience is to the rule of laws, not to persons. People obey because they think that rules (even bad ones!) provide stability to their lives and hence allow for rational calculations for individual plans of action. Modern constitutional governments of the North-Atlantic type (US, Western Europe post WWII), are the prime examples.

Another one is "traditional" legitimacy, which is semi-rational (people obey because they are used to obeying, and do not think too much about authority), and also impersonal (the focus of obedience is a tradition, not a person). Dynastic monarchies, in Medieval Europe, or African/Asian Ancient times, are the key political examples.

Charismatic authority, the third type, is both irrational (based on "love" to the ruler by the ruled, according to its Greek etymology), and personal: the target of the people's affection is a person, the leader, not rules or traditions. Examples? Ancient priests, druids, saints, military leaders, Jeanne d’Arc, Hitler, Ghandi … they were all the object of extraordinary amounts of admiration and love.

3) Is Castro a Charismatic leader? It is OK to say that in a dinner party in order to sound interesting. However, the real issue in Weber’s theory is that Charisma is not something inherent to Castro’s personality, responsibility, or body. Rather, the Cubans created a Charismatic authority by loving Castro ("Fidel, Fidel") and by attributing him supra-human, magical, attributes (pretty much like what progressive Americans did in relation to Obama only a year ago).

4) Does Castro WANT to be a Charismatic leader? Yes, of course. But the question is pertinent because Castro's speeches and policies are directed to a rational (not an irrational) audience: one that will appreciate the rational value of socialism, of a change in property rights, and the subsequent change in civic virtues and the enhancement of social cooperation. Only VERY rational citizens can get that message. Weber would have liked this: he thinks reality "mixes" theoretical ideal types in complicated, context-specific ways. Authority in Cuba is not only Charismatic. Were it so, it would have vanished long time ago.

5) An extension of (4). Castro exploits his Charisma (receives love) but the Revolution has been genuinely involved in creating a new, super-rational man (returns “consciencia”). Pretty unique authority process. The other few super-charismatic leaders, eg., Hitler, generally receive irrational support from their followers, and lead them to more irrationality.

1959-61: Revolutionary take-off

1) Any chronology of the first three years of the Cuban revolution shows one clear overarching trend: RADICALIZATION.

• International relations: gradual but rapid adoption of a starkly adversarial stand against the US; Sovietization in particular. From timid "Andreev opening" in Oct 1959 to full blown geopolitical, commercial, and political alliance with the Kremlin by late 1961. For the US, from the cold but still non adversarial visit by Fidel to the East Coast to Bay of Bigs and Missile Crisis.
• Economic policy: increasing state control and socialization, from rent controls in April 1959 to massive expropriation of assets, rural or industrial, foreign or national.
• Politics: embrace of Communism. From Urrutia's government (first months of 1959) to the ORI, via alliance with, and subsequent control of, Communist Party.

Hence, big picture is massive radicalization in all political and social orders.

2) What are the causes of radicalization?

In adversarial/complementary pairs, explanations are:

• Ideological. Castro's ideology: ultra radical from the start (Lecture 08, Suchlicki) or increasingly radical over time.
• Pragmatic, non-ideological (my favorite). Initial measures hurt some allies (the moderates, the US), which require substitution (PSP, USSR); new allies demand more radical measures, which in turn fuels the selecion process in favor of increasingly radical allies (Welch). Protection of revolution = radicalization of revolution (why I like it? Because it is eminently political, and is a very general mechanism, from French Revolution to Independence Wars in Latin America in the early 19th century. The Cuban novelty is the absence of a Termidor).

• Learning (Dominguez, Perez, Castro himself, all with very different flavors): rebel leaders realize that moderation or gradual reform is not a feasible option. Any change = radical change. Underlying economic, structural conditions shape stark options: radical change or staus quo (O'Connor, Perez).
• Positive feedback loop between Castro and followers (Perez): Castro proposes a radical measure, followers increase their expectations for change, Castro proposes a more radical measure, which in turn raises again public expectations for change.

• US errors and incompetent policies: stupidity and carelessness push Castro and Cuba into Communism and USSR's hands (Lecture 11).
• International political structures: geopolitical competition between US and USSR dragged Cuba into a much larger world game (reinterpretation of Lecture 11 using Waltz's neo-realism in IR).

3) Note: question of radicalization of revolution is obviously different from question of why rebels triumphed or why Batista fell. However, some causes of radicalization post January 1959 (economic structure a la O'Connor, or Ideology, or US diplomatic and IR errors) can also explain the events leading to the December 1958 revolutionary juncture.

Student Help: the "Pacts"

1957. July 12: Sierra Maestra Manifesto
November: Miami Pact
December: Castro denounces Miami Pact

1958. July 20: Pacto de Caracas


Central element for political analysis:

• Trade-off b/w goal of coalition building and goal of coalition control.

Then, two key questions:

1. Who is included as ally, who is excluded, and who gains control in each step?
2. What is more at stake: ideology or control? (Hint: compare Castro's argument against Miami Pact and his position in Caracas Pact, especially regarding military intervention).
   

Pacts are the visible results in the constant search for allies. Castro's condemnation of Miami pact (which excluded him) is part and parcel of his systematic efforts at keeping control over a movement that depends on coalition mobilization and expansion.

Pacts and counter-pacts are motivated both by the search of allies and the goal of control.

Student Help: FRUS

Framework for analysis

Dimension + examples in the late 1957 documents

1. Actors involved: State Department, US Embassy in Cuba, Pentagon, CIA, Attorney General (some proper names: Rubottom, Smith)
2. Actors mentioned: GOC (Batista), Cienfuegos mutineers, Miami Diaspora (Prio), Rebels (Fidel), US Congress, Public Opinion, International Communism.
3. Goals of actors involved: a) maximization of US international security and hemispheric defense (Pentagon); b) preservation of alliance with Cuban conservative elements (US Embassy in Cuba); c) Protection of capitalism/US property in Cuba ("Morley's goal," more imagined than real, but has some archival evidence); d) protection of international reputation (State Department); e) appeasement of US public opinion (politically/electorally minded types in State Department, Attorney). TWO CRUCIAL ISSUES: trade-offs b/w goals; negotiations between actors with different goals.
4. Concrete issues discussed: a) Prio problem (application of neutrality laws against exiles conspiring against Batista and supplying rebels), b) violation of MAP problem, c) radicalization of rebellion, d) Batista's dictatorial measures.
5. Policies suggested (means to achieve goals in 3). Big picture: "moderation" of political process. Problem: rebels and dictator do not trust each other, so prisoner's dilemma. US places incentives for moderation on both sides. For Batista, combination of sticks (suspension of arms sales, public condemnation) and carrots (control of Prio, public support). To break the vicious circle of distrust, US volunteers as a credible enforcer of moderation. Suspend arms if Batista does not de-escalate. Reinforce Batista is rebels do not de-escalate. Did not foresee the event that neither would de-escalate!
   

Definitions

State: Monopoly of violence, stock of resources required to enforce political decisions in a territory. Territory and violence are the key components. In terms of tangible assets, the state centrally includes army, police, jails, weapons (instruments that are used to threaten/prevent attempts at disobedience). A state can exist without schools or hospitals, but it cannot exist without weapons (Weber is relly the genius who discovered these features of the state, and the territorial character of the modern state, a complete innovation).

Regime: Institutions, formal or informal, of access to the state (i.e., to the control of resources that back up political decisions). Examples: in a democracy, the form of access to the state is elections (competitive and participatory).

Government: Specific group of people in control of the state. E.g.: Bush Jr government, or Obama government. State and regime remain the seam, but the team of people in charge changes.

Now, finally, Revolution: is it a change in government, regime, or state? Does it involve broader social change?

Think about the revolutions that we know:

Latin America Independence Revolutions: change in all three political levels, including the state, (because new territories are created, different from the old Iberian Empires), but no social change.

Soviet Revolution: change in Regime, Government, and Society, but not in the State (which in the beginning has the same old Russian territory).

French Revolution: paradigmatic case of regime change, but no change in state (France remains France). Change in social order? Yes, no more aristocracy.

American Revolution: change in State (the British empire breaks up), but not too much social change.

Mexican Revolution: no change in state, change in government and regime (but from one subtype of dictatorship to another subtype, caudillo to party), and broad social changes, which nevertheless fall short of socialism.

And the Cuban Revolution?