1959-61: Revolutionary take-off

1) Any chronology of the first three years of the Cuban revolution shows one clear overarching trend: RADICALIZATION.

• International relations: gradual but rapid adoption of a starkly adversarial stand against the US; Sovietization in particular. From timid "Andreev opening" in Oct 1959 to full blown geopolitical, commercial, and political alliance with the Kremlin by late 1961. For the US, from the cold but still non adversarial visit by Fidel to the East Coast to Bay of Bigs and Missile Crisis.
• Economic policy: increasing state control and socialization, from rent controls in April 1959 to massive expropriation of assets, rural or industrial, foreign or national.
• Politics: embrace of Communism. From Urrutia's government (first months of 1959) to the ORI, via alliance with, and subsequent control of, Communist Party.

Hence, big picture is massive radicalization in all political and social orders.

2) What are the causes of radicalization?

In adversarial/complementary pairs, explanations are:

• Ideological. Castro's ideology: ultra radical from the start (Lecture 08, Suchlicki) or increasingly radical over time.
• Pragmatic, non-ideological (my favorite). Initial measures hurt some allies (the moderates, the US), which require substitution (PSP, USSR); new allies demand more radical measures, which in turn fuels the selecion process in favor of increasingly radical allies (Welch). Protection of revolution = radicalization of revolution (why I like it? Because it is eminently political, and is a very general mechanism, from French Revolution to Independence Wars in Latin America in the early 19th century. The Cuban novelty is the absence of a Termidor).

• Learning (Dominguez, Perez, Castro himself, all with very different flavors): rebel leaders realize that moderation or gradual reform is not a feasible option. Any change = radical change. Underlying economic, structural conditions shape stark options: radical change or staus quo (O'Connor, Perez).
• Positive feedback loop between Castro and followers (Perez): Castro proposes a radical measure, followers increase their expectations for change, Castro proposes a more radical measure, which in turn raises again public expectations for change.

• US errors and incompetent policies: stupidity and carelessness push Castro and Cuba into Communism and USSR's hands (Lecture 11).
• International political structures: geopolitical competition between US and USSR dragged Cuba into a much larger world game (reinterpretation of Lecture 11 using Waltz's neo-realism in IR).

3) Note: question of radicalization of revolution is obviously different from question of why rebels triumphed or why Batista fell. However, some causes of radicalization post January 1959 (economic structure a la O'Connor, or Ideology, or US diplomatic and IR errors) can also explain the events leading to the December 1958 revolutionary juncture.